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BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES
statutory limitations by Judge Abraham Sofaer
and a thoughtful analysis by Kenneth de Graf-
fenreid of the lack of any formal mechanism in
the American policy-making process for consid-
eration of moral issues raised by proposed uses
of force.
This book's discussions of the application of
the just war concept to low-intensity conflict and
of the related issue of the capacity of interna-
tional law to take into account the range of con-
siderations employed in just war analysis are in-
teresting and provocative. Further, a number of
points made in the work are sure to stimulate
debate-for example, the argument made by
both Turner and Judge Sofaer that, while situa-
tions may present themselves requiring the
United States to violate international law, the
health of the international legal system de-
mands that such violations be admitted and ex-
plained rather than obfuscated.
However, certain aspects of the book limit its
utility somewhat. First and most basically, the
book contains no really satisfactory definition
of the phenomenon it addresses-low-intensity
conflict. Second, the section on international
legal constraints on low-intensity conflict con-
centrates almost exclusively on whether the con-
cept of self-defense set out in Article 51 of the
UN Charter would permit an armed response
to a low-intensity conflict launched against a
state by another state. But this approach begs a
number of important questions. Should there
be a legal difference under Article 51 between a
situation in which a state foments an insurgency
elsewhere that remains entirely dependent on
the sponsoring state, a situation in which a state
foments an insurgency that takes on a life of its
own while continuing to receive aid from the
original sponsor, and a situation in which a state
provides assistance to a genuinely indigenous
insurgency? What is the legal status of low-
intensity operations, such as provision of sup-
port for groups opposed to an unfriendly gov-
ernment-as given by the United States in both
Guatemala and Iran in the 1950s-which are
hard to fit under any reasonable definition of
self-defense? Third, with the exception of the
discussions byJohnson and O'Brien of the ethi-
cal standing of assassination (in which they
reach somewhat different conclusions), neither
the legal nor the ethical sections of the book
address certain of the most interesting specific
tactical issues raised by low-intensity conflict, as
contrasted with conventional warfare. Suppose,
for example, that a state, in an effort to erode
popular support for a target government, at-
tacks elements of the target government's civil-
ian infrastructure that have no military use but
whose destruction could increase popular dis-
content-for example, the civilian electrical
grid. Is such a use of force aimed purely at caus-
ing hardships to civilians ever permissible either
legally or morally, even if it involves no direct
loss of life? Fourth, the discussion of American
domestic constraints on low-intensity conflict
fails to consider contemporary attitudes toward
the risks of combat. Fifth, the connection be-
tween the concluding chapter and the rest of
the book is not entirely clear; in other words, it
is difficult to relate several of the recommenda-
tions to the conference papers and discussions.
Finally, while the conference was primarily con-
cerned with modes of ethical analysis associated
with the just war tradition, it would have been
interesting to have had at least some discussion
of other approaches as well. For example, a con-
sideration of low-intensity conflict employing
John Rawls's "veil of ignorance" approach
might yield insights additional to or different
from those reached through ajust war analysis.
In sum, while this work has some gaps and
limitations, the questions it provokes make it a
useful starting point for anyone setting out to
think about the complex and interesting issues
of law, morals and uses of force raised by low-
intensity conflict short of full-scale war.
A. MARK WEISBURD
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
School of Law
Intentional Oil Pollution at Sea. By Ronald B.
Mitchell. Cambridge MA. MIT Press, 1994.
Pp. xii, 346. Index. $36.50.
Ronald Mitchell raises two endemic and en-
twined questions that perennially challenge law-
yers and policy makers dealing with interna-
tional law in general, and international environ-
mental law (IEL) in particular. First, do treaty
rules matter and can they change behavior? Sec-
ond, can the lessons learned from the interna-
tional regulation of relatively moderate and lim-
ited occurrences, such as vessel-based oil pollu-
tion, be applied to the control of other, more
serious and widespread environmental prob-
lems, such as climate change and the protection
of biodiversity, and, if so, to what extent.? Mitch-
ell, assistant professor of political science at the
University of Oregon, brings his own disciplin-
ary perspective and insights to bear on these
1997]
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
important questions and answers, offering an
analysis that prompts a better understanding of
the nature and character of compliance, imple-
mentation and enforcement within the interna-
tional legal process.
He answers the first question by reviewing the
theoretical overlay of treaty compliance and
then moves beyond this scholarly base with an
empirical study that examines the application
of treaties regulating intentional oil pollution
during the past forty years. The empirical data
lead him to conclude that treaty rules can posi-
tively influence international behavior at both
national (governmental) and corporate levels.
The answer to the second question, summarily
stated, is that the example of intentional oil pol-
lution could be of use in other regimes, de-
pending on the circumstances.
Do treaties make a difference? Much legal
analysis centers on the jural nature of treaties,
and their interpretation and applicability, mak-
ing the a priori assumption that treaties do
shape and change the behavior of the relevant
parties. It is therefore useful to be reminded
about the substantial body of realist thinking
that defines international behavior and practice
in terms of geopolitical power rather than law.
According to the realists, nations agree to trea-
ties and the rules therein embodied because
they codify the existing or intended behavior or
practice of the parties. Parties conform their
behavior to treaty provisions because it is in
their self-interest to do so, not because they are
obliged to by law. The realists argue that it
would be a mistake to equate this spurious cor-
relation with true causation, as international
lawyers tend to do. Despite the strenuous exhor-
tations and exertions of international lawyers,
realist thinking is alive and well.
The author, a pragmatic institutionalist who
believes that treaties do change behavior, none-
theless accepts the existence of such realist skep-
ticism, and examines the empirical evidence of-
fered by intentional oil pollution to determine
if the realist argument has been rebutted. After
evaluating the evidence drawn from the control
of intentional oil pollution, the author con-
cludes that the empirical evidence repudiates
the realist thesis and "unequivocally demon-
strates that governments and private corpora-
tions have undertaken a variety of actions involv-
ing compliance, monitoring and enforcement
that they would not have taken in the absence
of relevant treaty provisions" (p. 299). Building
upon this premise, he proceeds to establish a
strong case by demonstrating that some primary
rules of obligation institutionalized within the
legal regimes created by IEL beget greater com-
pliance than others, for a cluster of reasons.
One of the reasons relied upon by the author
is that some rules fall within the "incentive-
ability-authority triangle." He offers illuminat-
ing explanations of ability and authority that
are worthy of close attention. By "ability" he
refers not only to the practical ability to comply
with rules, but also to situations where the ability
to violate rules was actually reduced. His con-
cept of "authority" is the power of national gov-
ernments to take action against polluting ships.
He illustrates that coastal states desisted from
acting against polluters because of doubts about
their jurisdiction to inspect and detain ships.
This shortcoming was remedied only when the
thorny questions ofjurisdiction were seized by
the International Convention for the Preven-
tion of Pollution by Ships (MARPOL), which
granted coastal states the right of inspection
and detention. The granting of such power or
authority led to much better enforcement and
greater compliance with its rules.
The need for nations and their domestic insti-
tutions to be possessed of authority to proceed
against foreign private entities that commit envi-
ronmental wrongs, rather than their foreign
governments, is cogently pressed home by the
author. He further argues that the experience
of oil pollution demonstrates why it is important
that nation-states be given the right to use trade
sanctions as a way of protecting the interna-
tional environment. This strand of the author's
conclusions can be interwoven with another of
his more striking points: the importance of en-
couraging "hegemonic" or "leader" govern-
ments to influence compliance by other states.
Such a thesis makes great sense in light of the
checkered experience of the United States, a
leader state that has exercised benign and bene-
ficial power to protect dolphins and other en-
dangered marine species, but has been assailed
for doing so because of countervailing free
trade obligations.
The author discerningly divides treaty re-
gimes, or "treaty compliance systems" as he
calls them, into three parts: primary rules, com-
pliance information systems and noncompli-
ance response systems. "Primary rules" are sub-
stantive rules, traversing a rule's ultimate goals,
the methods of achieving them, implementa-
tion and enforcement. "Primary rules" refer to
all and any rules stipulating discharge limits or
[Vol. 91 •
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other environmental control measures, as well
as those applicable to monitoring, reporting
and judicial and administrative enforcement.
He does not address the doctrine of state re-
sponsibility and does not, therefore, deal with
the somewhat tortuous differences between pri-
mary rules of obligation and secondary rules of
responsibility drawn by the International Law
Commission.
Mitchell also embraces a wide province for
IEL. He sees it as one that extends beyond
wrongful acts, and doctrines of state responsibil-
ity based on the vindication of such wrongs, to
a more proactive and precautionary system di-
rected at actual compliance or implementation
through machinery and mechanisms for secur-
ing compliance, and methods of patrolling non-
compliance. The author thus clarifies and sheds
understanding on treaty regimes of primary
rules as consisting not only of substantive, goal-
oriented obligations, but also of other rules pro-
moting or supervising compliance. He does not
isolate substantive rules from their implementa-
tion.
The author establishes a strong analytical
framework and develops it with imagination. It
is therefore disappointing that he does not deal
with the implications of his clear repudiation of
the realist thesis. If IEL and treaty rules make
a difference, is there something about the na-
ture of treaty rules, apart from their political
appeal, that elicits compliance? The author
could have consolidated his position about the
value of rules by addressing the view that rules
result in compliance because they are IEL-a
social force in its own right that is greater than
the sum of those rules. IEL commands and re-
ceives respect because it is law. Despite its re-
nowned asymmetry with municipal law and its
publicized defects in lacking a lawmaking and
law-enforcing sovereign, international law does
invoke compliance because it governs a law-
abiding community of states, not a gang of ban-
dits or bank robbers.I In this context, the author
could also have better canvassed the extent to
which a legal commitment to the "framework"
conventions set the stage for the more detailed
protocols.
Fortified by the strong foundation he has laid,
the author moves to answer the second question
posed-the extent to which the oil pollution
experience may be generalized. He reports that
I ROGER FISHER, IMPROVING COMPLIANCE wITH IN-
TERNATiONAL LAw 16 (1981).
it sobn became evident that many of the lessons
from the limited area of vessel-based oil pollu-
tion could be used to control much larger and
more endemic problems of pollution. The most
striking of these are the patterns of regulation
falling within the "incentive-ability-authority tri-
angle," and the "treaty compliance system."
These strategies are worthy of adoption, and
have in fact been adopted, to control a variety
of international environmental problems. It is
also evident that clarity serves compliance. In
IEL, as in other areas of international law, the
problem cases arise when actors confront aspira-
tional norms creating general obligations, as
contrasted with result-specific rules that contain
definite duties.
One of the author's significant conclusions,
however, is open to criticism. He offers exam-
ples of successful and failed strategies: design
and engineering rules that induced compli-
ance, as against emission limitations that did
not. While design and engineering standards
might have worked in the particular circum-
stances, this kind of rule gives rise to significant
doubts about its more general applicability.
Mitchell cites the examples of limitations on
the oil content of tanker discharges near shore,
institutionalized by the International Conven-
tion for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea
by Oil (OILPOL) in 1954, which were frequently
flouted and were replaced by ship-design stan-
dards providing for segregated ballast tanks
(SBT) in MARPOL, which have been successful
in reducing pollution caused by near-shore dis-
charges..
The problem with this example is that it seeks
to replace discharge standards that allow ship-
owners the freedom to choose how they might
achieve such standards in the most efficient man-
ner with procrustean uniform equipment or engi-
neering standards that are much more expensive
and demonstrably inefficient. Such equipment
standards have been excoriated in domestic envi-
ronmental settings as the worst examples of com-
mand and control regulation. The author ap-
pears to recognize this criticism and contends
that the more expensive and less efficient design
standards may be justified because they permit
much more effective compliance and enforce-
ment. He is right, of course, and a strong case
can be made for more effective, in contrast to
more efficient, regulation. The problem that re-
mains is whether nations would agree to similar
costs and expenses in analogous situations. There
were a number of nonreplicable factors present
1997]
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in 1972 and 1978 that led to the improbable con-
clusion of the parties agreeing to a significantly
more expensive form of pollution control, These
facts are referred to by the author, but the impli-
cation that must surely be drawn is that they will
not easily be reproduced.
A few reservations do not detract from the
impressive achievement of Ronald Mitchell in
writing a very well analyzed, conceptually clear,
thoughtful, timely and well-conceived book that
offers many insights into the questions of treaty
compliance. His book should present IEL law-
makers, policy makers and practitioners with
ample food for thought.
LAKSHMAN GURUSWAMY
University of Tulsa College of Law
The Precautionary Principle and International Law.
The Challenge of Implementation. (International
Environmental Law and Policy Series, Vol.
31.) Edited by David Freestone and Ellen
Hey. The Hague, London, Boston: Kluwer
Law International, 1996. Pp. xv, 268. Index.
Fl 195; $130; £84.
In their conclusion to this collection of essays
on the precautionary principle, the two editors
remind the reader that the precautionary prin-
ciple, while new as an environmental policy im-
perative, is not new as a human concept. Argua-
bly, the principle's appeal to common sense un-
derlies its remarkably swift international
acceptance. The failure of environmental policy
to prevent environmental degradation and the
emergence of various potentially irreversible en-
vironmental problems have forced interna-
tional environmental law to take a new ap-
proach to uncertainty. Where risks of serious or
irreversible damage are identified but conclu-
sive evidence is not available, a legal framework
demanding certainty cannot produce appro-
priate responses. This insight is now translated
into international environmental law and pol-
icy. Most recent legal instruments or policy doc-
uments endorse the general idea that absence
of conclusive scientific evidence should not be
used to postpone responses to threats of serious
or irreversible damage. However, although it
seems difficult to argue with this proposition,
the simplicity of this "better safe than sorry"
approach is more apparent than real. As the
title of the book suggests, the real challenge
lies in the implementation of the precautionary
principle-in determining in what cases, at
what point and to what extent precautionary
measures are warranted.
This volume, edited by Professor David Free-
stone of the University of Hull and Professor
Ellen Hey of Erasmus University, makes a true
contribution to revealing the many layers and
the complexity of these questions. It brings to-
gether leading experts from various disciplines
and backgrounds, including international law-
yers, economists, scientists and policy makers.
The book is divided into three parts of roughly
equal length, framed by an introductory and a
concluding piece written by the editors. Ac-
cording to Freestone and Hey, the collection is
intended as a "second generation" contribu-
tion to the debate on the precautionary princi-
ple (p. 14). Consequently, rather than reexam-
ining the rapid emergence and the legal status
of the precautionary principle, the book focuses
upon issues related to the principle's refine-
ment and implementation.
Part I, The Legal Challenges of the Precau-
tionary Principle, begins with a contribution by
Alexandre Kiss. He examines the important
links between the concept of intergenerational
equity and the precautionary principle, placing
most emphasis on the analysis of the former
concept. James Cameron andJuli Abouchar of-
fer a detailed and informative exploration of
the precautionary principle's scope and status
in international law. Reviewing relevant litera-
ture and drawing upon a broad range of inter-
national documents and domestic sources, they
conclude that the precautionary principle has
become customary international law. In their
view, an agreed-upon core can be distilled from
the varied formulations of the precautionary
principle, although disagreements remain as to
the threshold at which the principle is trig-
gered, whether it mandates only "cost-effec-
tive" or any necessary preventive measures, and
the impact of the concept of "common but dif-
ferentiated obligations." Catherine Tinker, in
her article on the implications of the precau-
tionary principle for the law of state responsibil-
ity, does not explicitly address Cameron and
Abouchar's arguments about the binding core
of the principle. However, she does suggest that
the principle's varied formulations would make
a finding of internationally wrongful behavior
and state responsibility difficult. Tinker argues
that the precautionary principle gives rise to a
series of procedural obligations, such as duties
to warn or notify, or requirements of environ-
mental impact assessment. In her view, the prin-
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